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We propose several models based on discrete-time
Markov chains for the analysis of Distributed Hash Tables
(DHTs). Specifically, we examine the Pastry routing proto-
col, as well as a Stealth DHT adaptation of Pastry to com-
pute their exact expressions for average number of lookup
hops. We show that our analytical models match with the
protocols’ simulation results almost perfectly, making them
ideal for rapid evaluation.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer routing has now been used for several years
in a diverse range of applications. Despite the age of many
such protocols, little work has gone into providing their for-
malised models. Existing analysis typically consists of sim-
ulated network scenarios rather than any proven mathemat-
ical models. While this is not necessarily the case for older,
unstructured algorithms, it is certainly true for newer, struc-
tured protocols. As compared to simulations, models can
allow for much quicker evaluation of protocols at a wide
range of settings. Furthermore, they can sometimes help to
gain an in-depth understanding of the protocols. Given the
popularity of many such peer-to-peer systems, it is therefore
important to provide their formalised models.
The approach to routing in most Distributed Hash Ta-
ble (DHT) based peer-to-peer systems involves iteratively
or recursively forwarding a message closer to its eventual
destination based on local knowledge at each node, reduc-
ing the number possible recipients with each hop. Conse-
quently, most protocols (e.g. Pastry, Tapestry, Chord and
CAN [6, 10, 9, 5] offer an expected O(logN) number of
lookup hops as an upper bound. In many of these previous
works, this represents the extent to which the proposed sys-
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tems are mathematically modelled; all remaining study is
based upon simulation or implementation results.
In this paper, we aim to address the lack of formal DHT
mathematical analysis by modelling DHT routing protocols
using discrete-time Markov chains to compute the expected
number of lookup hops. Specifically, we consider the Pastry
protocol [6] and a “Stealth DHT” adaptation of Pastry [1].
As Pastry was one of the first DHT protocols to be pro-
posed, it provides a suitably general representation of DHT
routing that we also describe in greater detail in Section 2.
Conversely, our previously proposed Stealth DHT work is
a recent development, allowing for unreliable nodes to be
separated from core DHT routing at a low cost, as explained
further in Section 5.
We know of only one other work that mathematically
analyses the performance of DHT protocols [7]. This work
proposes a formal framework based on Markov chains to
prove the performance of routing protocols in BaRT [8]
and Koorde [3]. Although the analytical approach taken by
Spognardi et al. also uses Markov chains, the differences in
routing methods between these protocols and Pastry make it
impossible to model Pastry and its associated Stealth DHT
using the exact methodology as proposed in [7].
We first study Perfect Routing models, wherein we as-
sume that an intermediate node along a routing path always
finds the “correct” next hop for a message. In practice,
however, this is unrealistic; actual routing tables are usu-
ally incomplete, with several empty cells. To counter this,
we derive other models for the protocols that emulate this
imperfection: Models with Imperfect Routing. We define a
route as “failed” if a node does not forward a message via
the next expected node (e.g. it uses a entry that is closer
to the destination but which shares the same prefix-match
length as itself with respect to the target ID). These models
allow us to derive the exact expressions for the number of
average hops required to reach any node in the DHT (i.e.
the lookup length).
We validate our models using simulations of the Pas-
try and Stealth DHT protocols, finding that there is a good
match between simulation results and the models. Since
simulations provide a realistic example of imperfect rout-
ing tables, the good validation results show that the models
formally prove the routing performance of the protocols.
Therefore, the expressions of the average number of hops
obtained through the models can be directly used instead of
simulations to quickly evaluate the protocols. Moreover, the
model results show that the increase in routing imperfection
exponentially affect the lookup length of the protocols. The
results from the models also help to improve understanding
in the choice of Pastry’s inherent configuration parameter b,
as defined in the following section.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We
present an overview of Pastry in Section 2. In Section 3
we discuss the Pastry model with perfect routing and de-
rive the expressions for the average number of lookup hops.
We then discuss the Pastry model with imperfect routing
and validate the model using simulations in Section 4. We
model Stealth DHT routing performance and validate the
models in Section 5 before we finally conclude the paper in
Section 6.
2 Pastry Overview
Each node on a Pastry network has a unique identifier
(ID), randomly generated within the address space. The
address space is dynamically partitioned into regions with
each region being assigned to the single node whose ID is
closest. Node IDs are represented in base 2b where b is a
constant representing the number of bits in each digit of ID.
Each node maintains a routing table, which is conceptually
a log2bN × 2
b array, where N is the size of the address
space. Thus each row of the array is partitioned into 2b
cells, which can accommodate more than one entry. The
dimensions of the routing table array are so given because
the entries in a row n contain references to nodes whose
IDs share a common prefix of length n digits. The first row
is conceptually row 0 containing entries that have no prefix
match, and since there are only log2bN rows it is impossible
to have all digits in common.
The routing procedure for a node that sends or forwards a
message is to select the row of its routing table correspond-
ing to its prefix match with the destination ID and pick as a
next hop the entry of the column corresponding to the value
of the first (non-matching) digit of the destination ID. For
example if a message arrives and the destination ID has n
prefix matches, the next node will be referenced in the nth
row and in the (n + 1)th digit’s column. This ensures that
the next hop of the message shares a longer ID prefix with
the destination than the current node (and is therefore closer
to the destination). It should be clear that one column per
row of the routing table contains an empty entry: this is the
column corresponding to the nth digit of the ID of the node
holding the routing table (i.e. the node itself). This is be-
cause the corresponding entry in row n would then share a
prefix of length n + 1 with the node, and should therefore
belong on the following row. This very concise and simpli-
fied description of the routing procedure is sufficient for our
discussion and we refer the reader to [6] for further details
of Pastry routing.
The maximum number of hops per message for a Pastry
network of N nodes is given as log2bN . This expression is
obtained because, in Pastry, routing follows a path governed
by a balanced 2b-ary tree that spans the entire name space.
The 2b-ary tree is formed due to the structure of the routing
tables, where each node is a source for such a tree.
In a 2b-ary tree, the network population is reduced by a
factor of 2b each hop until the lookup message reaches the
destination node. The number of hops a message takes, h, is
thus obtained as: N/2(bh) = 1, which leads to h = log2bN .
Therefore h is the number of hops when each node along
the path improves the lookup path towards the destination
by exactly one prefix match, which is an ideal case. We
call the expression h the Log Model for Pastry. In practice
however, there is a chance of a node’s ID improving the
match by more than one prefix, or a node may not improve
the prefix match at all (failed routes). In the former case, it
is obvious to see that the actual average number of hops per
message in Pastry is less than h.
Despite this, the Log model has been used to verify Pas-
try routing performance before [6, 1]. We found, however,
that the use of the Log model to validate simulation results
depends on the input parameters used in simulators such as
leafset size. In this paper, we model Pastry and Stealth DHT
routing protocols to derive the exact expressions for the av-
erage number of lookup hops.
3 Pastry Model with Perfect Routing
In this section we consider an ideal Pastry routing proto-
col wherein a node always forwards a message to the next
hop that matches the key by at least one prefix more than it-
self. Recall that an ID’s digits are represented in base 2b.
Therefore, the probability that two randomly chosen IDs
share a single prefix is p = 1/2b. Thus, the probability






A Pastry lookup (routing path) is made up of all nodes
that participate to deliver the message including the source
and destination nodes. We model the protocol using a
discrete-time Markov chain where each state represents the
number of prefix matches a particular node shares with the
destination. Each node on a routing path is thus modelled
by a state. Let Xn be a state of the Markov chain at a time
n. Pastry routing can be modelled using h + 2 states such
that Xn ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · ·h, h + 1}, where h is the maximum
Figure 1. Markov Chain without failures
number of hops a message can take. A state Xn = 0 is also
called the source state, where a node has a key to lookup
from the network. Conversely, state Xn = h + 1 is the
destination state. Before sending a message, a source node
may already be at any state. For instance, it can be at state
h + 1 if its ID matches that of the key, or at state i if it
shares i− 1 prefixes with the destination. At state Xn = 0,
a node only compares its ID to that of the key to identify the
next node to forward the message to (the next state). At any
other state i < h+ 1, upon receiving a message to forward,
a node finds the next hop from its routing table.
The structure of routing tables, when they are full, guar-
antees each node on the lookup path to improve the routing
towards the destination by one prefix match. In addition,
nothing stops a node having more than one prefix match
with the target. This however, is not guaranteed and hap-
pens only by chance. Therefore, the probability of improv-
ing a route by exactly one prefix match is equal to the prob-
ability that the next digit following the guaranteed one in
the next hop ID does not match the corresponding digit of
the destination ID. From our previous discussion, this prob-
ability is q.
We denote transition probability from state i to state j as
pji = P (Xn = j/Xn−1 = i). From the routing discussion
above, we can see that transition probabilities from state i
to state j (pji) always exist for all j > i. Note that pji for
j > i + 1 represent transition probabilities when a node is
fortunate enough to improve the routing by more than one
prefix match. The perfect routing protocol ensures that a
key gets closer to the destination every time the message
is relayed to another node, then for j ≤ i, the conditional
probability is:
pji = 0 ∀j ≤ i (1)
Generally, a transition from state i to state j occurs when
a node improves the routing by j− i prefixes, (i.e., the guar-
anteed prefix match and j − i− 1 extra matches that could
happen by chance). Thus, the transition leads to the follow-
ing corresponding expression of transition probability:
pji = p
j−i−1q, ∀j > i (2)
where q = 1− p.
Recall that the perfect routing model assumes that nodes
and routes do not fail, which means that pjj = 0. This
Figure 2. Modified Markov Chain for Pastry
routing without failures





0 if j ≤ i
pj−i−1q if i < j ≤ h
1 if i = h, j = h+ 1.
Fig. 1 shows the Markov chain for the perfect Pastry rout-
ing model. Observing the figure, one can note that all states
of the chain are transient except the last state, which is ab-
sorbing since once entered, the chain never leaves it. As a
result, the chain does not exhibit irreducible and aperiodic
properties necessary to obtain steady state, stationary dis-
tributions. Therefore, the average number of lookup hops,
which is obtained from the mean recurrence time of state
h + 1, cannot be computed from the Markov chain. To be
able to derive the average number of lookup hops, we trans-
form the chain to an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain
by adding a sure transition from state h+1 to state 0 as seen
in Fig. 2.
The transition probability matrix for the Pastry routing




0 q pq p2q · · · ph−1q ph
0 0 q pq · · · ph−2q ph−1
0 0 0 q · · · ph−3q ph−2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 0 0 · · · q p
0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0


The solution of the chain, which is the steady state prob-
abilities, is the normalised solution of the following sys-
tem of linearly dependent equations with variable vector
x = (x0, x1, · · · , xh+1)
xP = x (3)
After some simple arithmetic operations and inspection
of the transition matrix, it can be shown that the solution to




xh+1 if i = 0
qx0 if i = 1
xi−1 if 1 < i ≤ h




, for 0 ≤ i ≤ h+ 1. (4)
It can be easily shown that
h+1∑
i=0






From Leon-Garcia [4], the mean recurrence time for




= 2 + hq
The average number of hops for a lookup to reach a desti-
nation is the average number of transitions to move state 0
to state h + 1, which is equivalent to the mean recurrence
time of state h + 1 minus the transitions that do not rep-
resent hops, i.e., from state 0 to all other states and from
state h + 1 to state 0. Recall that transitions from state 0
are not hops as they only represent a chance prefix match
the source may have with the target, and the transition from
state h to state 0 does not represent a hop and is added only
to obtain stationary probabilities of the Markov chain. The
aggregate expected probability for these two cases of tran-
sitions is equivalent to
∑h+1
i=1 pi0 + p0,h+1, which is 2. We
therefore obtain the average number of hops for Pastry with
perfect routing (Hpastry) as follows:
Hpastry = E[Th+1]− 2
= hq (7)
Note that the comparison between the average rout-
ing performance of the Pastry model with perfect routing
(Equation (7)) and the Log model (log2bN ) is a function
of q, which is a protocol configuration parameter b. The
value of b = 4 has been typically used in Pastry [6]. Us-
ing the derived expression for the average number of hops,
we can determine how the performance difference between
the Log model and the Pastry model depends on b val-
ues. Particularly, the ratio of the average number of hops
of the Log model and the Pastry model without failures
is 1/q = 1(1−1/2b) . Note that limb→∞1/q → 1, which
means that the model asymptotically converges quickly to
the upper bound. This shows the extent to which the aver-
age number of hops between the two models compares as b
varies, which can aid in deciding on an appropriate value of
b. From this, we can conclude that small values of b are the
superior options.

























Figure 3. Validation of Pastry model without
routing failures
3.1 Validation
We validate our models against simulations that were
carried out using our own discrete-event packet-level Pastry
simulator, based on Pastry [6]. In [1], we showed that our
simulator can be validated against Microsoft’s Pastry Ver-
sion 3.0A simulator, as well as a real world implementation.
Each network size was simulated at least five times on a fa-
mous GT-ITM [2] generated transit-stub topology of 1,000
routers, with 4% transit nodes. DHT nodes, whose numbers
we vary from 10 to 7,000, were connected to this topology
in a random fashion. In each simulation run, 10,000 mes-
sages (each with a randomly generated key) were sent from
a randomly selected source.
Fig. 3 shows the average number of hops for the per-
fect routing model and for the simulations, both with and
without failures. The latter is obtained by considering only
messages that were delivered without routing failures. We
clearly see that the results for the Pastry model with perfect
routing matches well against the simulation results of Pas-
try without failures. However, the model underestimates the
simulation results with failures.
By definition, the perfect routing model assumes that no
route between nodes fails. That is, a node in the perfect
routing model always finds the correct next hop reference in
its routing table, which is possible only if routing tables are
full. Full routing tables further imply that all nodes along a
routing path use their routing tables to identify the next hop
(except the node just before the destination). However, note
that ph+1,h = 1 indicates that the next hop for the last hop
can either be determined using routing tables or leafsets.
Realistically, available routing table population mecha-
nisms in Pastry do not guarantee complete routing tables,
and neither is this required for the protocol to work. It is
often the case that some cells in a routing table are empty.
We therefore next model Pastry routing performance taking
into account this routing imperfection.
Figure 4. Markov Chain with routing failures
4 Pastry model with imperfect routing
We say a route between two nodes fails if a node finds
that the cell for the expected correct reference to the next
hop is empty. When a route fails, a forwarding node has to
look for another next hop reference from other cells in its
routing table. The new next hop reference is often chosen
as the closest node to the destination on the same row of
the routing table as the missing entry. Therefore, it does not
improve the lookup towards the destination because, except
for the entries in the correct cell, all entries on the same row
share the same number of prefixes to the key as the node
holding the routing table. From a Markov-chain perspec-
tive, this means that the state of the chain is unchanged.
The same applies if the failed route occurs at the source of
the message.
We assume that a message is equally likely to fail at any
state with probability pf . Transition probabilities for the
model with failures are obtained in a similar way as the




0 if j < i
pf if j = i, i 6= 0, h+ 1
pj−i−1q if i = 0, ∀ j > i
pj−i−1qqf if i ≥ 1, i < j ≤ h
qf if i = h, j = h + 1.
Fig. 4 shows the Markov chain for the model. Note that
routes do not fail at states 0 and h+ 1. Recall that state 0 is
the state used to decide the source’s beginning state on the
chain, and state h + 1 is the destination.
Using the same procedures as used for the Pastry model
with perfect routing, we obtain the average number of





where pf is the probability of route failure and qf = 1 −
pf . We next discuss validation results of the model using
simulations of the protocols.
4.1 Validation
Before presenting the validation results, we first discuss
the various methods we used to compute the probability























Figure 5. Validation of Pastry model with rout-
ing failures
of route failures. The correct approach is to analytically
compute the probability of failures based on network in-
put workload. As our efforts in this regard proved futile,
we resorted to the use of simulation results. There are two
possible ways this can be done: one is to use the fraction
of empty cells per row in a routing table, the other involves
tracking down all hops that are due to failed routes. We con-
sidered the latter option over the former as it provides the
actual failures from the simulation. As such, we tracked all
instances in the simulator whereby a node fails to find a next
hop reference in its routing table. If we denote the number
of failed routes from the simulations, the total number of
messages, and the average number of hops for simulations
as Fr , M , and Hsim respectively, then, for each network






Where h is the number of states where route failures are
possible. In some cases a fixed probability (pf ) of route
failure per state for each network size computed as the mean
of probabilities obtained from simulations as given in Equa-
tion (9) offers good validation results.
Fig. 5 shows the average number of hops for the model
against the simulation results as a function of network size.
We observe that simulations match the results of the model
very well when pf as given in Equation (9) is used.
It should be noted that both approaches of computing the
probability of route failure per state result in some estima-
tion of failure probabilities only. Moreover, the assumption
that the probability of a route failure is the same for each
hop is not realistic. Simulation results show that a large
fraction of route failures occur at a single state. To illustrate
this, Fig. 6 shows the distribution of route failures at dif-
ferent states for varying network sizes. It can be observed























Figure 6. The Distribution of route failures as
a function of states
from the figure that, for a given network size, the majority
of failures occur at a single state, and that this concentration
changes depending on the size of the network. For exam-
ple the percentage of route failures for a network of 3,000
nodes are <1%, 10%, 83% and 5% for states 1, 2, 3 and 4
respectively. Therefore, route failure is not uniform along
the states. Despite the mentioned approximations, the val-




We previously proposed the Stealth DHT concept to mit-
igate several performance and security issues encountered
in existing DHTs [1]. A Stealth DHT implementation of a
given DHT algorithm creates two distinct sets of nodes with
differing routing properties on the same overlay, namely
Service and Stealth nodes. Service nodes provide the rout-
ing infrastructure for the overlay, whereas stealth nodes
communicate with and through service nodes only.
The join process for most DHT implementations in-
volves a node first gathering state. Usually, this is achieved
by routing a join message addressed to its own ID into the
DHT via a bootstrap node1. Nodes along the message’s path
then reply directly with relevant routing information for the
joining node. Once the joining node receives notification
that its message has reached its destination, it announces its
presence on the network so that other nodes may route mes-
sages through it. Stealth DHTs achieve the separation of
nodes by halting the join process for stealth nodes after they
have gathered state, but before they announce their presence
1An already-connected node discovered through some alternate mech-
anism
on the DHT. The resultant effect is that stealth nodes do not
appear in any routing tables, and thus are not used to for-
ward any messages or store any keys.
Stealth nodes only initiate routing of messages by select-
ing the first hop. Therefore, they do not need to maintain a
leafset which is only used to consistently determine the last
hop. Stealth nodes maintain a pruned version of a routing
table with only one row. This is deemed enough and has
a negligible negative impact on routing performance while
significantly, reducing overhead. This is because stealth
nodes are only the origin of any messages they send through
the DHT.
Since stealth nodes have a reduced routing table, all cells
in its single row should be populated with appropriate en-
tries. This ensures that a complete and valid routing table
at a stealth node will always provide a next hop that has at
least a one-digit prefix-match with the destination.
5.2 Modelling Stealth DHT
From the service nodes’ perspective, the same model as
for Pastry applies. That is, the average number of hops a
lookup takes is the same as in a Pastry DHT with the net-
work population comprised only of service nodes. In this
section therefore, we need only derive the average routing
performance for stealth nodes. We first derive models when
only stealth nodes are considered as the origins of messages,
and then present the expressions for the average number of
lookup hops for the Stealth DHT with all nodes sending
messages.
Observe that the first hop a stealth node makes is similar
to the first hop of a service node which uses the first row
of its routing table. Thus, the maximum number of lookup
hops is the same as just considering a population of only
service nodes. To clarify: let the fraction of service nodes
be r and N the total number of nodes in the network, then
for a Stealth DHT, h = log2brN .
5.3 Perfect Routing Model
A stealth node does not need to compare its own ID to
the target key, instead, it immediately selects an appropriate
node to send the message to from its routing table. Indeed,
even if the stealth node does share an initial prefix match
with the key, its routing table will not enable a transition to
any state from state 0 other than state 1 since it has only one
row in its routing table. Therefore, the transition probability
from state 0 is given as:
pi0 =
{
0 if i > 1
1 if i = 1.
Unlike the models for a Pastry DHT, the transition from
state 0 to state 1 in a Stealth DHT therefore represents the
Figure 7. Markov Chain for Stealth DHT with-
out failures
fact that a stealth node always has to use its first row of
the routing table to send a message. This, together with the
modified value of h for Stealth DHTs, are the main distin-
guishing points in modelling a Stealth DHT from modelling
Pastry.
The correct next hop reference in a stealth node routing
table may, by chance, make as many prefix matches as pos-
sible. Thus, the Markov chain for Stealth DHT model is the
same as that of Pastry model for the rest of the states. In
particular, routing on a Stealth DHT is the same as routing
on Pastry with a network population equal to the number
of service nodes. Fig. 7 shows the Markov chain for the
Stealth DHT model with perfect routing. The correspond-




0 if j ≤ i
1 if i = 0, j = 1
pj−i−1q if i ≥ 1, i < j ≤ h
1 if i = h, j = h + 1.
To obtain the expression for the average number of hops
in the Stealth DHT model with perfect routing where only
stealth nodes send messages (Hstealth) and with fraction of
service nodes equal to r as, to modified the Markov chain
the same way as we did for Pastry in Section 3. Following
such Markov chain modification, the transition probability




0 1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 q pq · · · ph−2q ph−1
0 0 0 q · · · ph−3q ph−2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 0 0 · · · q p
0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0


Note that h = log2brN , where r is the fraction of service
nodes in the network. After some arithmetic operations, we





x0 if i = 1, h+ 1
qx1 if i = 2
xi−1 if 3 ≤ i ≤ h
Using this solution, we have pih+1 = 1(3+(h−1)q) , which
yields the mean recurrence time for state h+1 of the Stealth
DHT routing model (E[Th+1]) as :
E[Th+1] = 3 + (h− 1)q (10)
Subtracting 2 from Equation (10), we obtain the average
number of hops for a Stealth DHT with perfect routing
and that considers only stealth nodes to send messages
(Hstealth) as:
Hstealth = (h− 1)q + 1 (11)
Due to the manner in which a stealth node functions, this
never involves sending a message to itself (which would of-
ten be the case for small Pastry networks). The expression
of the average number of hops for a Stealth DHT that con-
siders all nodes (HSDHT ) is:
HSDHT = rHPastry + (1 − r)Hstealth
= rhq + (1− r)[(h − 1)q + 1]
= hq + (1 − r)(1 − q), r > 0 (12)
where h = log2brN and r is the fraction of service nodes.
Equation (12) shows that the average number of hops for
a Stealth DHT is quite close to the average number of hops
for Pastry when only service nodes are considered. This is
as expected, since stealth nodes do not participate in routing
and the first hop they make using their single row routing
table is no different from first hop of any service node using
its first row or a Pastry node in a network of the same size.
Similar to the case of Pastry, the perfect routing Stealth
DHT model does not portray an entirely realistic scenario.
We therefore consider a Stealth DHT model with routing
imperfection in the following section.
5.4 Model with Imperfect Routing
The derivation of the Stealth DHT model with imperfect
routing from the associated perfect routing model simply
follows the same procedures as that of the equivalent Pas-
try models. For example, the closed form expression for




0 if j < i
1 if i = 0, j = 1
pf if j = i, i 6= 0, h+ 1
pj−i−1qqf if i ≥ 1, i < j ≤ h
qf if i = h, j = h+ 1.
Using the same procedures as before, we get the expres-
sion for the average number lookup hops for Stealth DHT
model with probability of routing failures pf , and that con-
siders only stealth nodes to send messages (Hfstealth) as:
Hfstealth =
(h− 1)q + 1
qf
(13)























Model with mean pf
Figure 8. Validation of Stealth DHT with fail-
ures, pf = 0.1093
where qf = 1− pf .
The expression of the average number of hops for a
Stealth DHT with imperfect routing when considering all
nodes is given as:
HfSDHT = rH
f








Simulations were carried out where 10,000 messages
were sent from randomly selected stealth nodes to randomly
generated IDs within the address space. A fixed network
size totalling 1,000 nodes was considered, and the number
of service nodes was varied from 10 to 800, comprising 1%
to 80% of the total network respectively.
Fig. 8 shows the average number of hops of a Stealth
DHT obtained from models and simulations as a function of
service nodes. We observe a generally excellent agreement
between the model and the simulations, particularly for net-
works with large numbers of service nodes. However, the
model underestimates the simulations for both choices of
probability for route failures for small networks. This oc-
curs in small networks because the routing imperfection in
stealth nodes severely alters the routing performance by in-
troducing randomness in choosing the next hop. Addition-
ally since most of route failures are observed at state 1 for
small networks (see Fig. 6), a route failure at a stealth node
makes it very likely for the route to fail at the first service
node as well. This is because the service node will also use
the first row of its routing table. This, naturally makes the
routing performance worse.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we model the routing performance of Pas-
try and its corresponding Stealth DHT implementation and
validate the models using simulations of the protocols. We
consider a perfect routing case in which nodes’ routing ta-
bles are assumed to be always full, as well a realistic case
where some cells in routing tables are often empty. Routing
table imperfection causes a lookup to follow a non-optimal
routing path, which, through the derived models in this pa-
per, is shown to have an exponentially negative effect on the
routing performance of the protocols. We use simulations
to demonstrate that the models offer average routing perfor-
mance that agree with the simulation results very well. They
can therefore be used instead of simulations to quickly eval-
uate the protocols in a wide variety of experimental setups.
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